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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL R. MELLEN,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

.

I

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
UTAH RICHARDSON ROOFING, and
THE ST ATE INSURANCE FUND,

)i

Case No.
10795

Def endants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW Daniel R. Mellen, plaintiff herein, and
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing
in the above-entitled case.
This petition is based on the following grounds:
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POINT I
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
POWERS CASE, WHICH WAS CITED AND ARGUED
IN THE ORAL ARGUMENT.
POINT II
THE DECISION IN THIS CASE DISCOURAGES
SCRUTINY BY THIS COURT OF REPORTS OF MEDICAL PANELS.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION ARBITRARILY DISREQARDED
AND IGNORED THE EVIDENCE AND ADOPTED THE
REPORT OF A MEDICAL PANEL WHICH DID NOT
BELIEVE ANY OVEREXERTION CASE SHOULD BE
COMPENSABLE.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellant

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
POWERS CASE, WHICH WAS CITED AND ARGUED
IN THE ORAL ARGUMENT.
There is no mention made by the court of the recent case
of James H. Powers, Plaintiff, vs. Industrial Commission of
Utah, and Salt Lake City Corporation, Defendants, No.
10587, filed May 10, 1967. The opinion in the Powers case
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was published after the brief had been filed in the Mellen
case. However, at the oral argument the Powers case was
cited by counsel for plaintiff and argued as the case most
persuasive in favor of reversing the denial of an award. Yet,
the court in its opinion has seen fit to ignore the Powers case.
On page two the court states that plaintiff relies heavily and
only on three cases, to wit: The Baker case, the Jones case,
and the Purity Biscuit case. It is true that these cases were
relied on by plaintiff in his brief. However, at the argument
of this case, as shown by the recording, counsel stressed and
emphasized the Powers case as the case most controlling for the
decision in the case at bar. It was stated at page three of the
Powers decision:
"The law is well settled that the aggravation or
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial
accident is compensable and that an internal failure
brought about by exertion in the course of employment
may be an accident within the meaning of the act."
It was further stated:
"\'iV e are of the opinion that in these cases we are

only concerned with the proposition as to whether or
not an ordinary exertion as contrasted to an unusual
exertion caused the injury in question."
In spite of the striking similarity between the Powers
case and the case at bar, the court has seen fit to ignore the
law as laid down by the Powers decision and has taken pains
to distinguish the three cases cited in our brief. Plaintiff did
not c1te these three cases as cases with identical fact situations
and agrees that the fact situations in said cases may be distinguished from the fact situation in the case at bar. However,
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plaintiff felt that two of these cases were good examples of
cases where this court has reversed the Industrial Commission
for failing to find in accordance with the evidence. This is
exactly what the Industrial Commission did in the case at
bar. The Purity Biscuit Company case was cited as authority
for the rule that the unusual exertion rule does not apply in
the State of Utah. The Jones case was a good example of a
case where the evidence on the side of the denial was inconclusive; whereas, the evidence on the side of the plaintiff was
positive and direct, the court reversing the denial by the
Industrial Commission for not following the evidence. Likewise, the Baker case was a case where this court reversed for
the reason that the Commission did not follow the evidence.
In distinguishing these cases, the court has seen fit to state
that the Baker case is inapropos and to cite at length from a
special concurrence by Chief Justice Wolf in the Purity Biscuit
Company case in which he proposes a rule which would require a plaintiff to prove causation by clear and convincing
evidence. This rule has never been adopted. The court goes
on to cite the case of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202, as a case in point. The Carling
case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the
Carling case there was evidence of a hearing loss as early as
1945 where plaintiff was claiming a single incident as damaging his hearing in 19~ There was clear evidence in that
case supporting the denial of award by the Industrial Commission. However, no such evidence exists in the case at bar.
In the case at bar there is no evidence that plaintiff had
complaints of heart trouble prior to the incidents in question.
The evidence is undisputed that prior to the week in question,
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plaintiff was a productive member of society and that following the week in question he was not. The Powers case is clear
authority for the proposition that exertion precipitating a
heart condition is compensable.
The court also cites the case of Burton v. Industrial Commission, 13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439, as controlling. In the
Burton case the family physician, who was not a heart expert,
merely testified that the occurrence in question could be a
factor. In opposition to this testimony, there was direct testimony that the coronary thrombosis with myocardial infarction
was not caused by the exertion of the work. There was no
such direct compelling evidence in the case at bar. This court
stated that plaintiff's personal physician thought, with some
qualification, that the onset was due to the extra exertion on
the roof. Plaintiff refers the court to the record which shows
no qualification in the testimony of Dr. Behrens. He stated:
"I do feel that the exertion which he carried on during that day hastened the onset of the ultimate situation."
As opposed to this, Dr. Kilpatrick admitted that the exertion could have precipitated the myocardial infarction.
Thus, we see in the case at bar evidence of "it could have
been" as opposed to a positive "was." It is submitted that
this situation is comparable to the state of the evidence in the
Jones case.

POINT II
THE DECISION IN THIS CASE DISCOURAGES
SCRUTINY BY THIS COURT OF REPORTS OF MEDICAL PANELS.
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On the fourth page of the opinion, the court rejects plaintiff's contention that the medical panel report was based on
incorrect interpretation of the law and contrary to the undisputed evidence. The court indicates in its opinion that it is
improper for counsel to criticize and take issue with medical
panels in cases such as this. Certainly, it is the function of
this court to review the findings by the Industrial Commission; and when the Industrial Commission adopts the findings
of medical panels, it appears that the function of this court
would be to scrutinize said reports to see if they are based on
incorrect interpretations of law and incorrect findings from
the evidence. The panel report states in part as follows:
"The panel members have agreed that the situation
of overwork, anxiety related to financial reverses, etc.,
should not be a factor in considering an industrial accident. * * * The actual work he was doing was no
different than he had been accustomed to for a number
of years. Hence the situation as it was, with his pain
in the chest occurring long before the day of the
alleged injury, would tend to indicate that he had a
natural evolution of the degenerative process in his
heart, which culminated in an attack of pain * * *."
(Italics ours)
The basis for the decision by the Industrial Commission
is the medical panel report. It is obvious that a legitimate
inquiry would be as to the basis of the report, both as to law
and facts. If the medical panel is laboring under a misapprehension of the law and refuses to apply the correct law, then
certainly its report would be subject to attack. Likewise, if
the panel is laboring under a misapprehension of the evidence,
then this would be a legitimate area for attack. It is submitted
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that the panel in this case believed that overwork is not a
factor in an industrial accident, contrary to the law in this
State. In addition, this panel believed that a plaintiff must
show an unusual strain as contrasted with a usual strain in
order to recover. In addition, the panel has stated that plaintiff had pain in his chest long before the day of the alleged
incident, which is a misstatement of the evidence in this case.
Certainly these things are legitimate areas of attack in this
case. When the Industrial Commission adopts and follows
the report, it is committing the same errors as the medical

panel.
The panel report in the Powers case contained the same
misapprehension of the law as to an unusual strain being
required, and the report was properly rejected by this court.
In the recent case of Garner, et al., v. Hecla Mining Co., et al.,
No. 10667, filed August 24, 1967, the dissenting opinion
points out that the panel in that case thought that plaintiff
had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
issue of causation. It is obvious that a legitimate area of appellate review is whether there is a proper basis for the finding of a medical panel. The decision of this case discourages
scrutiny of medical panel reports and therefore is tantamount
to an abandonment by this court of its proper appellate function.
Incidentally, the opinion in the case at bar cites the case
of Garner v. Hecla Mining Co. as authority for its holding.
This case cannot be used as authority for the case at bar for
the reason that it is an occupational disease case. Coverage in
such a case is limited to certain named diseases or injuries to
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health, which "directly arise as a natural incident of exposure
occasioned by the employment," and only where it is shown
there is a "direct and proximate causal connection between the
conditions of the work and the occupational disease," and
which does not result from a hazard to which the workman
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment.
There is no such requirement under ordinary Workmen's
Compensation cases such as the case at bar. As was stated in
the Powers case, an aggq. ¥ation or lighting up of a pre-existing
disease by an industrial accident is compensable. All that need
be shown in this type of case is that the industrial accident
aggravated, lighted up, or precipitated a pre-existing condition from nondisabling to disabling. This is exactly what
happened in the case at bar. It was undisputed that Mellen
was a working, producing individual prior to the incident in
question, and that he was not thereafter.

POINT III
THE COMMISSION ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED
AND IGNORED THE EVIDENCE AND ADOPTED THE
REPORT OF A MEDICAL PANEL WHICH DID NOT
BELIEVE ANY OVEREXERTION CASE SHOULD BE
COMPENSABLE.
It is most surprising that this court had no criticism of the
panel report in the case at bar. It is submitted that the plaintiff, or any applicant could not possibly receive a fair rePort
from a panel which has prejudged his case. The panel report
stated that the panel members had agreed that overwork
should not be a factor in an industrial accident. Thus, they
have stated that in any case where overwork is alleged as a

8

precipitating cause, they would find against the applicant.
Submitting a claim before such a panel is contrary to the most
elemental concepts of justice in this country, where we believe
that people should have fair hearings before impartial and
unbiased judges. This panel, by its own words, has disqualified itself from sitting in judgment on plaintiff's claim.
The undisputed evidence is in favor of plaintiffs claim.
It is undisputed that the pain in his chest was directly connected with the exertion on the job. In addition to this, we
have an unqualified opinion by a heart specialist that the exertion precipitated and hastened his present heart disability.
Dr. Kilpatrick admitted on cross-examination that this could
have happened. How could Dr. Kilpatrick or the other members of the panel rule in favor of plaintiff when they have
already stated that they do not believe that overwork should
be a factor in considering an industrial accident? The medical
panel in this case has created its own law. The panel has
stated what it believes the law should be, rather than following the law as established by this court. This court has held
that overexertion cases are compensable. How can this court
fail to find fault with a panel which has so blatantly rejected
its holdings?
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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